At the same time, total capital importation into Nigeria rose to $10.37 billion, an 83.8% increase compared with the same period in 2025. This is also a 61% rise from the previous quarter.

Telecoms barely registered in the inflow mix, while banking and finance absorbed most of the funds entering the country.

Banking alone pulled in $7.55 billion, while the financing sector followed with $2.43 billion. Together, they accounted for more than 96% of total inflows.

Most of the capital entering the country came through short-term instruments. Portfolio investment topped the list with about 95% of total inflows, and foreign direct investment small at $135 million, or roughly 1.3%.

Telecoms, by comparison, attracted just 0.07% of total inflows, trailing even trading, agriculture, IT services and equities.

The decline in the sector stands out when set against recent years. Telecom capital importation reached $496.27 million in 2025, while it stood at $456.59 million in 2024. In 2023, it dropped to $134.75 million, before rising again in 2022 to $456.83 million.

A steep drop was recorded in the latest quarterly figures as seen. Inflows fell 91% year-on-year from $80.78 million in Q1 2025 and also dropped 93% from $103.36 million in the previous quarter.

Policy changes in the sector have not shifted investor behaviour. Early in 2025, the Nigerian Communications Commission approved a 50% tariff adjustment for operators with an aim to improve revenue and support network expansion.

Operators also increased spending. The commission said telecom companies invested more than N2.5 trillion in infrastructure in 2025. That is over $1 billion in network upgrades.

Even so, foreign inflows did not follow, as investors appear more focused on fixed-income returns than long-term infrastructure commitments. High yields in money market instruments and bonds continue to draw capital.

This means money is coming in, but not where long-term investment is most needed.

Foreign exchange reforms have helped strengthen activity in banking. Still, volatility in the currency market still weighs on long-term decisions, especially in sectors like telecoms that require steady capital planning.

The International Finance Corporation and the World Bank have in past reports pointed to the need for stable, long-term investment conditions in infrastructure-heavy sectors. That gap is very much visible in the current data.

Heavy dependence on short-term inflows leaves productive sectors exposed. Telecoms, manufacturing and agriculture all receive limited foreign capital.

These risks must be looked into as foreign investment in Nigeria drives growth for telecom, banking and many other sectors.

That is a 36% year‑on‑year increase from 2025, making this one of the fastest capital expenditure (CapEx) booms in modern corporate history. 

So, let’s discuss. Is this exceptional AI CapEx surge cycle driving productivity in the economy, or are we inflating another technological asset bubble?

The AI CapEx Scale: What’s Happening Now

Across the largest tech firms, the hyperscalers and cloud giants, capital spending is now structural. Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft are expected to put hundreds of billions into new infrastructure in 2026, much of it dedicated to specialised computing clusters, advanced networking and data centre capacity. 

The focal point of this spending is not mere servers or office upgrades. It’s data centres built specifically for high‑power compute workloads, facilities optimised for parallel processing at scale. 

These require specialised hardware like GPUs and high‑bandwidth memory, and they draw massive amounts of energy. 

One recent example shows just how strategic these moves have become. Nebius Group signed a multi‑year deal with Meta Platforms worth up to $27 billion to supply dedicated AI computing capacity by 2027, a contract driven by extreme demand and limited supply for high‑performance computing systems. 

Productivity: What the Investment Could Bring

No doubt that enhanced computing capacity enables economic value. Faster processing, more reliable inference workloads, and greater cloud availability can drive:

• Higher labour productivity by automating routine tasks.
• Faster research and development cycles in sectors from healthcare to manufacturing.
• Lower costs for compute‑intensive services, once infrastructure matures and utilisation improves.

For context, the semiconductor industry, a cornerstone of this infrastructure build‑out, is forecast to approach nearly $1 trillion in sales in 2026, with AI‑specific chips maintaining strong annual growth. 

From a macro perspective, such CapEx adds directly to aggregate demand and GDP in the short term. Data centre construction, advanced chip manufacturing, and supporting supply chains all contribute to economic activity that wouldn’t exist without this cycle. 

Bubble Territory: Where the Risks Begin

But there are strong arguments that we are edging into asset inflation rather than productive investment.

First, the pace of spending vastly outstrips current revenue realisation in the economy. Many of these specialised facilities operate at negative operating margins early in their life, requiring ongoing funding before they generate sustainable returns.

Second, a lot of the valuations attached to tech infrastructure assets incorporate lofty future earnings expectations. If those earnings don’t materialise, because adoption slows or competition increases, we could face rapid repricing. 

We’ve already seen some tension in the market, with certain historic investment commitments being scaled back. 

Third, hyperscalers are relying more on external financing even as their own cash flows get tighter. That’s a classic hallmark of an investment boom that may not be fully backed by near‑term productive returns. 

Semiconductors and Data Centres: The New “Oil”?

The analogy of compute as “the new oil” captures two truths:

1. Dependency: Modern AI workloads require massive compute capacity, just as 20th‑century industry relied on petroleum.
2. Infrastructure bottlenecks: Scaling compute, even with unlimited capital, is limited by semiconductor supply, power delivery, and cooling technology.

Already, suppliers like TSMC have posted strong revenue outlooks, showing reliance on advanced chips across the industry.

In parallel, smaller specialist data centre operators, such as CoreWeave, have expanded at a rapid clip. CoreWeave now operates dozens of facilities globally and has become a major supplier for bespoke compute capacity. 

But then, this infrastructure is expensive and energy‑intensive. Many facilities find it hard to break even without long‑term contracts or guaranteed utilisation.

Investment Implications: Winners and Fragilities

From an investment standpoint, certain firms appear ready to benefit if demand holds:

• Nvidia is at the centre of the compute supply chain. Its recent San Jose GTC 2026 forecast shows at least $1 trillion in chip revenue by 2027, driven by demand for next‑generation chips at scale. 
• Other chip designers and foundries stand to gain from backlogged orders and long production lead‑times.
• Data centre REITs and infrastructure funds may see longer‑term cash returns as contracts mature.

On the risk side, overcapacity, falling prices for older hardware, and slower adoption outside of hyperscale use cases are still substantive challenges.

So, Growth Engine or Asset Bubble?

Standing here in March 2026, we see both sides.

On the productivity side, this spending wave is building infrastructure that will underpin major advances in how industries operate. It’s tangible investment in capacity, not just speculation in intangible assets.

On the asset inflation side, the pace and scale of spending go beyond today’s revenue reality. Markets have priced future growth aggressively, which increases the risk of repricing if adoption deviates from expectations.

Now, are we financing a foundation for long‑term productivity, or are we inflating the price of future earnings prematurely?